surprising that he claims that governments should always act "within the law" and "through law," that is to say, morally, even when confronted with severe emergencies. Note, however, 6 DYZENHAUS (2006), supra note 2, at 14. 7 Id. at 13. 8 Id. at 63-65. 9 Id. at 4-7. Law, as he later reformulates, "is constituted by values that make government under the rule of law worth having" (139). 10 In one particularly revealing passage, Dyzenhaus specifies that in order "to count as law or as authoritative, an exercise of public power must either show or be capable of showing that it is justifiable" in terms of fundamental principles "that do not depend for their authority on the fact that they have been formally enacted." Id. at 5. He elsewhere explicitly refers to these principles in terms of "constitutional morality." D. Dyzenhaus, The Puzzle of Martial Law, 59 U. TORONTO L. J. 1 (2009) at 39, 49, 53. that even if one accepts Dyzenhaus's thick conception of legality, this last observation in no way entails that states cannot, conceptually speaking, act illegally (qua immorally) or even, as he also claims, that it is always possible for them to act in legally (qua morally) acceptable ways.
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For example, there may well be situations, often referred to as moral dilemmas, in which all options available to a state would involve unjustified moral wrongdoing. Although Dyzenhaus is probably right to point out that no theory of morality or legality should focus exclusively or even centrally on such tragic cases, they can certainly not be ignored.
Oddly, Dyzenhaus resolutely refuses to concede this point given his adherence to what he takes to be Hans Kelsen's core conceptual commitment-i.e. that the notion of state presupposes the notion of law, and that a state is in fact nothing but a national legal system. To the extent that this "identity thesis" is accurate, it is indeed difficult to claim intelligibly that a state can depart from the law of that system-i.e. from itself-at least in the absence of contradictory norms. I will return later to Kelsen's thesis. For the moment, notice only the implausibility of coupling such identification of state and law with the claim that law is akin to public morality. This juxtaposition of claims implies that states cannot act immorally, which no doubt represents a deeply counter-intuitive proposition. If Dyzenhaus held the common view that law is morally fallible, 12 this problem would not arise, but remember that his claim is that law's potential to provide appropriate moral resources is inexhaustible.
11 With respect to this last point, Dyzenhaus claims that, to the extent that a state's constitution is sufficiently flexible, it is always "possible to exercise power through law in a way that sustains the aspirations of legality." Dyzenhaus (2008) To be fair, Dyzenhaus does, in a somewhat curious way, recognize that law-let's refer to it as morally legitimate law to account for his view-can sometimes run out. He persistently refuses to distance himself from A.V. Dicey, who maintains that the prospect of "times of tumult or invasion" requiring illegal state responses can never be fully discounted. 13 I say that this admission is curious since, to avoid falling prey to a paradox, Dyzenhaus is forced to drive an uneasy wedge between 'law' and 'legality,' or between what he also calls 'rule by law' and 'rule of law.' According to this distinction, state reactions to public emergencies may intelligibly fall foul of the law, yet be 'legal' at the same time. Unlawful reactions are legal in this senseDyzenhaus speaks of reactions in a "spirit of legality" 14 -when they constitute proportionate
responses that uphold what he counts as legal values. This move, he thinks, enables him to reconcile his own claim about the unintelligibility of state illegality with Dicey's remarks about the possible need for official illegality in times of emergency, as well as about the appropriateness of Acts of Indemnity that may be adopted ex post facto to "legalize illegality."
He argues that such Acts are appropriate when they authorize retrospectively what was already 'legal' in some sense. They ought "to secure the rule of law, not to undermine it," to "indemnif [y] My hope is that this partial yet critical survey of Dyzenhaus's account of the relation between state and law will serve as a note of caution against conflating conceptual and normative inquiries too easily, given the important distinctions that tend to be lost, or made implausible, as a result. In order to focus productively on the very real challenge posed by the identity thesis and avoid Dyzenhaus-like confusions, it is methodologically important to distinguish the conceptual question of whether a state can possibly depart from the law from the issue of the morality of its actions -including the question of whether extra-legal public Thorburn, Justifications, Powers, and Authority, 117 YALE L. J. 1070 (2008) . On the distinction between permissive and power-conferring norms: RAZ, supra note 19, at 85-106.
law often seems less sensitive to moral arguments in the context of public law than, say, in that of criminal law, where claims of moral justification or excuse are commonly recognized.
When an action is invalid, yet not wrongful, the legal consequence is characteristically just that: it is judicially recognized as invalid or void, and given no legal force or effect. From the point of view of the law, the action in question is as good as inexistent; it leaves no trace.
Of course, this position may strike some as discordant with reality. For example, one might object that invalid state actions can give rise to legitimate expectations on the part of people who reasonably rely on them, and that, morally speaking, it would sometimes be wrong (and possibly quite harmful) for the law to defeat them. Furthermore, in many jurisdictions, courts accept this reasoning and go out of their way to protect the interests of reasonable reliers by treating certain invalid actions as if they were legally valid (as far as those interests are concerned intelligibly depart from the law, it will be important to keep in mind both possible types of departures.
II. STATES AS EXTRA-LEGAL ACTORS?

A. Situating and Problematizing Kelsen's Identity Thesis
With these two sets of background considerations in mind, we are in a good position to inquire into whether states can intelligibly depart from the law. The first thing to note is that, pace Dyzenhaus, Kelsen's conceptual identification of state and law, which is at the root of the puzzle under consideration, has been the subject of much controversy over the years. To start with, it has some odd consequences. For example, it entails that each state can only have one valid legal system, and that a colony can never obtain its independence from its colonizer by peaceful legal means (since, for Kelsen, legal continuity implies continuity of state). What's more, the controversy extends deep into debates about the nature and normativity of law since, when asserting that the state is simply another name for the legal order, Kelsen is really contending that a legal system is irreducibly normative and cannot be seen as the product of social facts. Thus, he rejects the position, espoused by many other legal positivists, that a sociologically-understood entity or practice-say, an independent political society in a habit of obedience to a sovereign, in Austin's terms, or the social practice of a rule of recognition, in
Hart's terms-stands at the foundation of a legal system. For Kelsen, the state is the law and, as such, it is nothing but a "juristic" phenomenon all the way down, tied together by chains of legal validity leading back to a postulated basic norm. Thus, the acts of so-called state organs do not deny that a legal or, to be more precise, a constitutional normative order is essential for state-government agency-quite the opposite. What they deny is that duly constituted governments cannot conceivably act illegally (or, for that matter, immorally).
The gist of their position is that some groups of interacting human beings can be relatively autonomy agents-that is, they can form intentional attitudes and perform concerted actions that are irreducible to the attitudes and actions of their members-thanks at least in part to the operation of a normative framework. Modern state-governments, which are made up of various (and often conflicting) institutional organs, which are themselves relying on the 32 The most sophisticated defender of this position is Philip Pettit who, in line with the usage described, tends to refer to "states" and "governments" in the same breath. See e.g. P. Pettit, Responsibility Incorporated, 117 ETHICS 171 (2007) that they present to it for consideration.
Some theorists describe the process by which the moral agency of individuals is constitutionally coordinated to give rise to irreducible governmental agency as a process of 'institutionalization,' 'integration,' or 'conglomeration' which tends to survive specific individuals members and their political regimes. In his latest work on the topic, Philip Pettit further refines this claim. He notes that groups whose judgments depend on the judgments of more than one individual can be agents insofar as they respond rationally to their environments on a reasonably consistent basis. Constitutions facilitate group agency by assigning decisional roles to the group's individual members and setting limits on what they can and cannot do. To the extent that the group's constitution provides sufficient constraints against internal inconsistencies, the group operating under it may then be a relatively autonomous agent over time (despite deriving all its matter and energy from its individual human members). Pettit argues that constitutional constraints are sufficient for a group to be autonomous in this sense when they ensure that majority views do not always prevail, such that the group's attitudes cannot be described as a simple majoritarian function of the member's attitudes. In Pettit's own words: "Autonomy is intuitively guaranteed by the fact that on one or more issues the judgment of the group will have to be functionally independent of the corresponding member judgments, so that its intentional attitudes as a whole are more saliently unified by being, precisely, the attitudes of the group. Responsibility theorists tend to argue that one must be 'responsible' in a basic sense before one can violate norms (and, thus, perpetrate wrongs). They also often argue that one must at least be assumed to be responsible in this basic sense before one can intelligibly be 'held responsible' in the sense of being singled out by the law or by morality to bear the adverse normative consequences of such violations. 38 The basic responsibility in question is the ability, or 'fitness,' to recognize and respond appropriately to reasons (including norms), and is a concomitant of rational agency. According to the position under consideration, stategovernments' constitutions may enable them (as well as some of their institutional corporate subparts) to process reasons for action systematically and form judgments that are irreducibly their own, despite the need to draw on the resources of their individual members to do so.
Governments can then plan for action on the basis of their own judgments, identify some individuals as agents to perform required tasks, and more or less ensure that they perform them in the relevant manner. In other words, state-governments (and some of their institutional corporate subparts) may control in a reason-sensitive way for the performance of certain actions by individuals who act on their behalf. The thought is that they are fit to be
held responsible for what they control in this way. They can arrange for illegal and immoral things to be done or participate in doing them and, just like individual agents, they can intelligibly be singled out to bear adverse normative consequences as a result.
Admittedly, this understanding of government as the "source" of illegal and immoral deeds needs to be fleshed out further. Pettit's remark that a corporate entity such as a state- 38 The contrast I have in mind is akin to the one that H.L.A. Hart draws between 'capacity-responsibility' and 'liability-responsibility,' and that J. Given that Dyzenhaus argues that torture should never be officially condoned either ex ante or ex post facto, this may be the point that he is trying to convey. To be convincing, though, the point must be refined. In many situations in which individual officials violate duties while 39 Pettit (2007) , supra note 32, at 196.
40 Dyzenhaus (2008) , supra note 2, at 54-55.
acting without governmental license, there may still be a question of accessorial governmental wrongdoing. For example, a government may have provided individuals with the opportunity to violate various duties, without per se empowering them to do so. It may, say, have required police officers to patrol a peaceful demonstration dressed in uniform, batons in hand. If they then run amok, beating innocent protesters and detaining them capriciously, their government may not be in a position to deny all responsibility. It may be held responsible for wrongfully failing to control conduct that it should (and, often, was legitimately expected to) have controlled, or for wrongfully aiding or procuring it. In other words, it may be held responsible as an accomplice. 41 Here, there is really no need for theorist like Pettit to deny that Dyzenhaus and Kelsen's concern has some grounding in truth. There is likely a point at which wrongs perpetrated by public functionaries are so severe, so extraordinary, and so unconnected to their official roles and functions, that it would make little sense to talk of the government as a wrongdoer in relation to them (except perhaps vicariously). But, as Pettit would surely caution us, we should be careful not to jump too hastily to this conclusion.
What should we make of such an account? On the plus side, it sensibly evades Kelsen's criticisms directed at those who mysteriously characterize group entities like states or sub-state corporate agents as "superhuman beings." 42 For Pettit, any sound account of irreducibly responsible group agents must recognize that human beings are at the root, forefront and 41 The case for holding state-governments responsible as accomplices may also extend beyond the realm of wrongful actions perpetrated by governmental representatives acting qua principals. Consider, for example, the case of government A that facilitates the sale of arms to a government B that is known to have severely abused its citizens in the recent past. Government A organizes trade missions, encourages home companies to sign contracts, subsidizes them, signs a bilateral treaty facilitating the sale of arms, and so forth. If government B then proceeds to use the arms bought to commit, say, serious crimes prohibited by the domestic law of A, international law, as well as morality, couldn't government A conceivably be held responsible as an accomplice in all these realms? Notice that, in some such cases of accessory wrongdoing, no question of ultra vires use of power might even arise.
42 See e.g. KELSEN (2006) , supra note 22, at 108, 184-186. assumptions are fundamentally individualistic, and compatible with value humanism, according to which the value of anything, including group agency, ultimately derives from its contribution to human life and its quality. One might also point out that his account also has the advantage of providing a distinct ground for holding groups such as state-governments responsible-say, because their actions or organization made harm likely or inevitable-when no similar ground is available for holding individual contributors responsible. Such shortfalls of individual responsibility may arise when, for example, individual contributors to governmental action are exonerated for their acts owing to reasonable mistakes or ignorance, due care, duress, or other relevant factors. Legal regimes of governmental responsibility may guard against such scenarios, as well as diminish the incentive to arrange things so as to increase their likelihood.
Still, some major questions subsist, of which I can unfortunately only scratch the surface here. For example, as recent work in the theory of individual excuses has sought to demonstrate, the exonerating force of epistemic limitations and other types of pressures inherent in organizational settings is arguably far less significant than has traditionally been believed. 43 One salient reason for this skepticism is as follows: insofar as individuals knowor, perhaps, should know-that they are participating in the operation of a group decisional framework that may, by its very constitutional design, yield bad or harmful outputs, it is questionable whether they should ever be able to escape consequential responsibility by 43 invoking the irreducibility of these outputs. If this reasoning is sound, the shortfall of individual responsibility argument may not provide as compelling a case for regimes of group responsibility as Pettit thinks it does. Furthermore, if one digs deeper into the details of his argument for irreducibility, one cannot help but notice the stringency of its foundational rationale. As suggested earlier, Pettit contends that a group displays irreducible agency when it "collectivizes reason" in its formation of judgments, in the sense that it brings together individual judgments in ways that may bring its overall judgment on some particular matters into disaccord with the judgment of the majority of its individual members. Pettit claims that for such discrepancy to be possible, the group's constitution must require individual members to aggregate their judgments on each premise of a decision, rather than aggregate their final judgments on the overall decision. He also allows for more complex "distributed premisebased procedures" where different subgroups specialize on judging specific premises, so long as ultimate group judgments are constituted by aggregated judgments on separate premises as opposed to overall decisions. 44 While it is at least plausible that many state-governments considered holistically, with all their internal balances and checks, are constituted in ways that normally satisfy this requirement, specific governmental organs such as courts, legislatures, ministerial cabinets and administrative agencies may well not be so constituted. Therefore, it
simply cannot be assumed, like Pettit sometimes seems inclined to do, that these governmental organs, when considered on their own, will be agents capable of being held responsible in an irreducible sense.
In the end, though, the most powerful challenge for this robust way of thinking about governmental legal responsibility might reside in Kelsen's work itself. Indeed, insofar as it is just (or otherwise justified) to hold a group responsible for a breach of legal duty, can the law not simply treat the group as if it were per se capable of this breach? Kelsen would probably insist that recourse to such legal fiction, whatever else we may say about it, is much less obscure, counter-intuitive, and difficult of application than a more organic approach like Pettit's. It is true that Kelsen is uncomfortable with the idea of state legal wrongdoing and that, insofar as he comes close to recognizing it, he goes out of his way to relate it back to the wrongs of certain individual officials-not their government or its institutional corporate
organs. Yet, as I mentioned earlier, he is also receptive to the idea of collective legal responsibility, of which he speaks primarily in terms of a legal fiction-the corporate "juristic person"-which he characterizes as "a group of individuals treated by the law as a unity, namely as a person having rights and duties distinct from those of individuals composing it." 45 Such a fictional entity, he explains, is unified by a specific system of norms-a "partial legal order"-regulating the behaviour of individual members, and serving as the common point of imputation for all human acts, presumably both individual and collective, that are determined by it. 46 When such acts violate duties that the law imposes on the corporate juristic person, they result in wrongs (or "delicts") that are intelligibly, if only fictionally, attributable to it.
The key point to note here is that Kelsen asserts that "a delict which is a violation of national law can be imputed to any […] regulates the manufacture of staplers), I see no reason to think that it is not the very state that adopted it that is contravening the constitution. A defender of Kelsen may retort that this insight can be explained by the fact that the law in question is not really unconstitutional since it has not been annulled by any legally competent organ-that is to say, it is not really invalid, but merely voidable. Yet, this cannot be the end of the story. There is an important sense in which, if the constitutionally defective law continues to be interpreted and applied in the 'incorrect' manner by all relevant parties, and this new understanding becomes entrenched, the constitution will have been departed from, or modified, in the process. Thus, in such cases, it may be more accurate to say that the constitution has changed or been departed from, even if only minimally, while the identity of the state and, for that matter, the legal system as a whole have not been altered. My claim that there is more to the state than its constitutional law helps makes sense of this intuitively-appealing position.
To clarify the matter, it is useful to push the of the country and insisting on a restoration of the previous constitutional order. 57 However, the crucial point here is that the impact of these decisions on the state's identity was necessarily related to the political strength of the courts making them, as reflected in their acceptance or rejection by the rest of the political community. This point could probably be extended to most scenarios of significant constitutional turmoil. Even if, as a result, it will often be virtually impossible to predict at which precise point on a spectrum of unconstitutionality a given state will cease to exist, such uncertainty does not entail that states cannot act unconstitutionally. On the contrary, significant unconstitutional actions often fail to undermine the identity of states, which can even sometimes be praised or criticized for them when there is a moral issue at stake. There is no conceptual impediment to states being thought of in this way. To be sure, it is true that in the context of a coup, acts contrary to prevailing constitutional norms will often become constitutionally authorized in some sense. For example, an allegedly legal, yet also clearly political pronouncement, may hold sway like in the Pakistani situation discussed above, or the constitution may be modified ex post facto to legalize illegality. However, the ultimate test for determining the identity of state is not legal recognition in this secondary sense. It is, first and foremost, persistent recognition by the relevant political community.
One appealing upshot of this understanding is that it makes intelligible the widely held assumption that constitutions are not "suicide pacts" that states must necessarily uphold in all their facets if they are to subsist. This outcome is salutary given the long judicial and theoretical lineage of the assumption. 58 Even a thinker like Immanuel Kant, who deduces from a priori
